Codes of Conduct: The Fiction of Corporate Self-Regulation by Roht-Arriaza, Naomi
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2001
Codes of Conduct: The Fiction of Corporate Self-
Regulation
Naomi Roht-Arriaza
UC Hastings College of the Law, rohtarri@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Codes of Conduct: The Fiction of Corporate Self-Regulation, 58 Guild Prac. 38 (2001).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/694
 
 
Faculty Publications 
UC Hastings College of the Law Library 
 
Author:  Naomi Roht‐Arriaza   
Source:  Guild Practitioner 
Citation:  58 GUILD PRAC. 38 (2001). 
Title:  Codes of Conduct: The Fiction of Corporate Self‐Regulation 
     
Originally published in GUILD PRACTITIONER. This article is reprinted with permission from GUILD 
PRACTITIONER and National Lawyer’s Guild. 
NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA
CODES OF CONDUCT:
THE FICTION OF CORPORATE
SELF-REGULATION
What are the international obligations of corporations in regards to hu-
man rights and the environment? Human rights law and environmental law
are based on the idea that governments regulate private actors to do as their
national government tells them, but on the international level the obligation is
on states, not private actors.
It works quite well in theory, but not in practice, as we all know. Govern-
ments don't adequately regulate corporations, especially given globalization.
So there has been a need to try to find a way to bypass the state intermediary,
and work directly at the level of corporate entities.
There were attempts in the 1970s to do this. The idea was to try to create
a binding code that would govern the activities of multinational corporations,
including financial misconduct, technology transfer, corruption, and some
human rights and environmental obligations. It was rejected by the United
States and other powerful countries. The approach that was taken instead
was a code-of-conduct scheme: corporations would voluntarily come up with
codes of conduct in these areas, making regulation unnecessary because they
would take care of the problem themselves.
It has become abundantly clear that this approach has serious limitations.
One is that each corporation gets to decide what level of its own performance
is adequate. Sometimes they do a good job, but usually they do not. In
addition, there is no disclosure, no outside verification or enforcement.
There have been a series of efforts to improve the code-based approach.
There is a set of OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment) Guidelines on Multinational Corporations, which was revised in June
2000. It contains a list of obligations to respect human rights, practice envi-
ronmental stewardship, prevent corruption, and act as a good corporate citi-
zen. It's a broad set of obligations which in and of themselves are not bad.
The problem is enforcement.
The Guidelines set up a system of national contact points, where individu-
als can supposedly assert claims against corporations that are not complying
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with the OECD Guidelines. There is no judicial process. When you bring a
complaint, the national contact point is supposed to look into it, talk to the
corporation, and attempt some sort of conciliation or mediation. Non-gov-
ernmental groups find this approach unsatisfactory, but it is a starting point
for developing a complaint procedure that would have at least the value of
exposure.
In the United Nations, there are a number of different efforts; some of
them work at cross-purposes with each other. The U.N. Subcommission on
Human Rights directed a group of experts to work on a code of conduct. It is
basically an attempt to bring together in one comprehensive document the
many codes that already exist. It is a compendium covering crimes against
humanity, labor rights, the environment, the use of security forces, and other
areas. Some members on the Subcommission favor making this a mandatory
code through the U.N. system. But that won't happen anytime soon.
One obstacle is the Global Compact that was adopted at the world eco-
nomic board at Davos in response to the U.N. Secretary-General's advocat-
ing measures to avoid a Seattle-like backlash. It too is a completely unen-
forceable arrangement, whereby transnational corporations sign on to nine
principles: businesses are to support and respect the protection of interna-
tional human rights within their sphere of influence and make sure their own
corporations are not complicit in human rights abuses; they must work to
eliminate forced and compulsory labor, child labor, and discrimination in oc-
cupation; and must undertake initiatives to promote environmental responsi-
bility and the development and transfer of environmental-friendly technolo-
gies. But the Compact does not spell out the obligations of these corpora-
tions.
Another problem is that there is no way anyone can tell whether a corpo-
ration that signed on to the Compact is complying, and whether what it says it
is doing is enough. Nonetheless, this is the measure that is being pushed
through the U.N. system, and much effort is being made to get corporations
to sign on to it. An indication of the limits of this approach is the initial list of
signatories, such Shell and UNOCAL, who are defendants in ongoing human
rights litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
One effort to strengthen the code-of-conduct approach involves improv-
ing the. disclosure provisions. What kind of information do corporations have
to provide? To whom do they have to provide it? When corporations have to
put out information about what they are doing, interesting things happen.
Suddenly all the employees of the corporations get this data and start generat-
ing internal processes and changes. Local communities, regulators, and in-
vestors also start tracking data on bad-or-good performance.
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A number of different disclosure-related vehicles are being discussed.
There is an International Right to Know Coalition of nongovernmental groups
that is working to pass federal legislation that will expand existing disclosure
requirements on U.S. corporations' overseas operations. Much of the infor-
mation those corporations now have to provide covers only their operations
in the U.S. The right-to-know approach seeks disclosure to verify corpora-
tions' statements that they don't have a double standard, but use the same
systems everywhere. Such disclosure should not be burdensome if they re-
ally act overseas as they do at home.
The International Right to Know Coalition is considering extending the
right to know in the areas of TRI (toxic release inventory) - data about what
kind of pollutants corporations release above a certain threshold - and re-
source extraction (requests to expand permits). In the U.S., to expand a facil-
ity, generally a Clean Air Act or a Clean Water Act permit is required, which
regulates what and how much can be discharged into the environment. Gov-
ernmental requirements abroad exist in many places only in theory.
The Coalition's proposed bill alsoapplies to OSHA regulations. It ex-
tends hazardous materials disclosure to overseas operations. It requires re-
ports on labor rights policies, public and private security arrangements in-
volving military or paramilitary forces, the human rights policy and any hu-
man rights-related complaints that the corporation has received. It requires
the disclosure of the name and location of facilities abroad and the facilities
and subsidiaries of contractors and suppliers. And it would include penalties
for noncompliance.
The disclosure issue has been very touchy. Corporations have not wanted
to provide the locations of their subcontractors and suppliers, claiming com-
petitive disadvantage: if the information were public, their competitors would
be able to undercut them and lure away their best suppliers. This ignores the
human rights advocates's position that there is no way to verify corporate
statements of compliance without disclosure of suppliers so they can be moni-
tored.
Another approach is being tried through the SEC. Publicly held corpora-
tions must file annual reports, and disclose to shareholders anything that will
have a material impact on share price, including environmental matters. They
usually don't do this. There is an attempt now to make the SEC require
greater and more detailed disclosure on environmental and human rights is-
sues. For example, criticism of Shell for its human rights policies in Nigeria
eventually led to bad publicity, boycotts, and lawsuits, all of which will have
an effect on share prices. Investors need to know what's going on. There i.
no reason why the SEC can't do this; it's a political, not a legal, problem.
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The last approach I want to mention uses the unfair business practices
law. An effort is underway to penalize corporations under unfair business
practice penalties for claims of good conduct, such as falsely stating that they
pay their workers double the minimum wage. Getting the benefit of invest-
ment from people who are concerned about these issues is then unfair and a
violation of the unfair business practice law.
Kasky v. Nike' is a case in California that is proceeding on precisely these
grounds. Phil Nike claimed the company was paying minimum wage and a
half and that it had no labor problems. People went into Nike factories and
found they were not even paying minimum wage, much less minimum wage
and a half So suit was brought under the California unfair business practices
law.
The case was dismissed on First Amendment grounds. The court said that
because Nike's statements hadn't referred to any particular Nike product, but
referred to Nike as a company, they were not commercial speech, but politi-
cal speech, addressing a matter that was of great political import and public
discourse of the U.S. The case is on appeal to the California Supreme Court.
NOTES
1 2 P. 2nd 1065, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 (2000), rev. granted, No. S087859, Jun. 21, 2000.
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